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Though syntacticians have devoted considerable effort to elucidating the mapping between 
S-structure and LF, relatively little attention bas been paid to the mapping between S­
structure/LF and If (=logical fonn, i.e. truth conditional semantics or 'real' semantics). It 
will be argued in this paper that recent extensions of standard X' -theory to so-called 
'functional' (non-lexical) categories provide the crucial link between the syntactically 
motivated representations of LF and the semantically motivated representations of If. 
Specifically, it will be claimed that there is a small set of functional categories in nominals, 
parallel to those that have been posited for sentences, which are strongly motivated on both 
syntactic and semantic grounds. What this means is that given a semantically motivated 
logic for natural language, positing these functional categories provides, on the one hand, 
syntactic representations that com:ct1y account for the syntactic properties of nominals and, 
on the other hand, a universal and maximally 'transparent' compositional mapping of 
syntactic representations onto the representations of If, using only a limited range of 
semantic operations such as functional application and type-shifting. 
The logic assumed here is a property theory of a kind that has been argued for on 
independent linguistic grounds by Chiercbia (1984, 85, 89) and Cbiercbia and Turner 
(1988). It is a multisorted first-order language"with four basic sorts p, U, 1t, e (the 
universal sort), standing for propositions, individuals, properties and entities, respectively, 
plus the predication relation U: 1t -> <c,p> and its inverse. The syntactic representations 
assumed here are those licensed by a 2-level version of X' -theory with only binary 
branching which applies uniformly to both lexical and functional categories. It will be 
argued that the minimal set of categories needed to characterize nominal structures is: 
D(eterminer), Nm, N(oun). The category D has been argued for on syntactic grounds by 
(among others) Abney (1987) and Bowers (1987). The category Nm, intermediate 
between D and N, generalizes the category NBR proposed by Ritter (1989) for Hebrew 
and the category Q proposed by Mallen (1989) for Spanish; it is parallel in form and 
content to the category Pc, intermediate between I and V, proposed by Bowers (1988, 89, 
91). 
The main syntactic claims of this paper are: (1) nominals universally have the following 
structure: lDp ... lD' D [NmP •.. [Nm' Nm [NP ... [N' N ... ]]]]]]; (2) possessive NPs are 
either base-generated in [Spec, D1 or moved there from [Spec, Nm1, the canonical position 
for 'subjects' of nominals, or from [Spec, N), the canonical position for 'objects' of 
nominals; (3) strong determiners in the sense of Milsark (1974) and Barwise & Cooper 
(1981) belong to the category D, while weak determiners are APs which are X'-adjuncts 
licensed by Nm; (4) actionnominals derive from underlying structures with real subject or 
object arguments in [Spec, Nm1 and [Spec, N) and the head Noun raises to NmO, parallel 
to the raising of V to PIO in sentences (Bowers (1989, 90), Larson (1988»; (5) result 
nominals and basic Nouns, in contrast, neither have real subject and object arguments nor 
do they undergo raising to NmO. 
The main semantic claims of this paper, intimately interrelated with the syntactic claims, 
are: (I') NPs denote properties and are therefore translated in If as expressions of type 1t; 
(2') the category NmO, like the category PIO, is universally translated as \./, the 
predication operator; (3') X' -adjuncts are uniformly translated as modifiers, hence weak 
quantifiers do not change the type of the expressions they modify; (4') the members of D, 
in contrast, following the theory of generalized quantifiers (Montague (1970), Barwise & Cooper (1981», map properties onto sets of properties, thereby changing the type of their 
NmP complements; (5') if there is no lexical determiner in D, then D is automatically 
inteIpreted as the existential quantifier 3. 
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Before discussing and justifying these claims in detail, it is fust necessary to summarize 
the results of my previous work on predication and the structure of propositions (Bowers 
(1991». The analysis of nominals proposed in this paper is tightly integrated with the 
analysis of sentences proposed there. Indeed, the strong parallelism between sentential and 
nominal structure that results from my analysis of nominals constitutes a crucial piece of 
evidence in its support. 
1. The Syntax of Sentences 
It is claimed in Bowers (1991) that the universal canonical D-structure of sentences (apart 
from onJer) is the following: 
(1) IP 
(noifi'mabve ) 
I 
subJecOagent Pi 
(nominative) Pi' yP 
objecflUleme � (or V') 
(accusative) V' iOmplement/oblique 
V indirect 06jCCtJgoal 
(dative) 
Embodied in this structure are a number of claims having to do with (1) predication; (2) 
direct objects; (3) indirect objects and complements. I discuss each of these topics in tum. 
1.1. Predication 
A major unresolved question in the generative framework is whether main clause (MC) and 
small clause (SC) predication can be unified in purely SbUctural tenDs. In (2) are 
e�mplified a range of conSbUctions that might reasonably be characterized as 'small 
clauses', some with PRO subjects, others analogous to ECM constructions: 
(2) a.I consider [John crazy]. 
b. We regard [them as fools]. 
c. She put the book [pRO on the table]. 
d. The lions eat the meat [pRO raw]. 
e. With [Mary sick] , nothing is getting done. 
f. f. John ate breakfast [PRO naked]. 
In (3) are illustrated a number of proposed structures for SCS: 
(3) a. 'SC' 
NP XI> 
b. xp (Stowell) c. i (Williams) NP XP V" i VPi 
Clearly, none of these SbUctureS have anything in common with the standard SbUCture for 
main clauses, regardless of whether the internal subject hypothesis is assumed or not: 
(4) a. Ir b. IP 
NP" r NP �YP r VP r 
--V' 
Suppose, however, there is a functional category 'Pr' intennediate between I and V, which 
projects its own phrasal categories just like other lexical and functional categories. 
Predication can then unifonnly represented as follows: 
(5) 
(subject) 
NP e:-p_ ..... Pr'-=---.XP::-=. (predicate) 
x= {V,A,N,P} 
Whether we have MC or SC predication simply depends on whether the category PrP is a 
complement ofl or V: 
(6) a. MC: b. SC: __ Y",-_ 
V PrP 
NP -_-w� =-.,.".. pf NP, AP ,PP, VP 
VP 
Not only does hypothesizing the category Pr unify MC and SC predication, providing a 
purely structural characterization of the predication relation, but it also solves a related 
problem, namely, what category to assign SCS to: it is simply the maximal projection of 
Pr. Moreoever, it does so within the limitations of a uniform 2-level version of X-bar 
theory, unlilce other proposals such as Fukui ( 1986), and without invoking the use of base­
generated adjuncts, as in Stowell (1981) (illustrated in (3) b.) and Koopman and Sportiche 
(1985, 87). A further bonus of this theory is that it solves a minor but significant mystery 
of English grammar, namely, how to categorize the element as, which appears in SC 
constructions such as (2) b. It can simply be regarded as a visible realization of the 
category Pr. Finally, as will be discussed in 12, the category Pr provides the syntactic 
basis for uniform semantic theory of predication. 
I now summarize briefly some empirical arguments that support positing a universal 
syntactic category Pr. One such argument can be derived from the fact that constituents 
consisting of a direct object and complements of various kinds can, quite generally, be 
conjoined: 
(7) a. Mary considers John a fool and Bill a wimp. 
b. John regards professors as strange and politicians as creepy. 
c. Sue put the books on the table and the records on the chair. 
d Harriet gave a mug to John and a scarf to Vivien. 
e. I expect John to win and HaITy to lose. 
f. We persuaded Mary to leave and Sue to stay. 
g. You eat the fISh raw and the beef cooked. 
h. I convinced John that it was late and Bill that it was early. 
i. They told Sue who to talk to and Virginia when to leave. 
Clearly, such Sb'Uctures are impossible to generate under the standard analysis of VP. In 
the theory proposed here, on the other hand, they are easily analyzable as instances of 
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across-the-board extraction of V from a conjoined VP: 
'Pfp 
r vSP yP NF l" NP � the .loks i on J�ble the lnus Ii on �r chair 
We know on the basis of comparative evidence that non-auxiliary verbs don't raise to 1 in 
English (Emonds (1978), Pollock (1989». Hence, the A TB extraction of V required in 
these structures is only possible if there is an xO position between 1 and V which the 
extracted verb can be located in. The needed head position is, 1 suggest, Pr.l 
Independent evidence for this conclusion can be derived from RNR sentences (Larson 
(1990» such as the following in which the raised constituent must be a VP containing a V­
trace: 
(9) a. Smith loaned, and his widow later donated, a valuable collection of manuscripts 
to the library. 
b. Sue moved, and Mary also transfeITed, her business to a different location. 
c. 1 succeeded in convincing, even though John had failed to persuade, Mary not to 
leave. 
d We didn't particularly like, but nevertheless ate, the fish raw. 
e. Most people probably consider, even though the courts didn't actually find, Klaus 
von Bulow guilty of murder. 
f. Flo desperately wants, though she doesn't really expect, the Miami Dolphins to be 
in the Superbowl. 
Further evidence for the existence of Pr can be derived from the familiar observation that 
predicative expressions of different syntactic category can be conjoined: 
(10) a. 1 consider John crazy and a fool. 
b. Bill is unhappy and in trouble. 
c. 1 regard John as crazy and as my best friend 
d *1 regard John as crazy and my best friend 
In the theory proposed here, such sentences are analyzable as conjoined PrP complements: 
(1 1) [Pr P 1 [Pr' consideq [vp Johnj [PrPlPrp tj crazy] and lPrP � my best friend]]]]] In any theory that treats SCs as projections of lexical categories (e.g. Stowell (198 1», on 
the other hand, such examples will incorrectly be ruled out as instances of the general 
prohibition against conjoining phrases of different categories. Notice, incidentally, that the 
contrast between (10) c. and d provides further evidence that as is a lexical realization of 
PJO, the fonner being exactly parallel to (1 1), the latter ruled out as a violation of the 
constraint on conjunction just mentioned. 
1 .2. Subjects and Objects 
Modern research has revealed many fonnal syntactic similarities between subjects and 
objects, a number of which are listed below: 
(12) i. The subject c-commands everything else in clause; the object c-commands 
everything but the subject (Barss and Lasnik ( 1986». 
ii. Both subject and object are assigned structural case (Chomsky ( 1981». 
iii. Both subject and object can can agree with the verb. 
iv. Both subject and object control PRO subjects of infmitive and SC complements. 
v. Both subject and object are possible non-9 positions (postal and Pullum 
(1988», hence landing sites for NP-Movement. 
To account for this parallelism, I follow a line of thought that goes back to at least 
Chomsky (l9SSnS), Dowty ( 1982), Jacobson (1983) and Bowers ( 1983), namely, that 
the verb and its complements form a D-structure constituent which is predicated of the 
direct object. This notion is further developed in works such as Jacobson (1987), Bowers 
(1988, 89), and Larson (1988), which claim specifically that direct objects are generated in 
[Spec, V), parallel to the position of subjects in [Spec, Prj. According to this view, a 
sentence such as John will put the book on the table would be represented as follows: 
(13) ___ IP=---c 
NP 
J
r 
:;t' � Pi yP I � Y' I V" pp e . Jo e the 000k pdt on tit! table 
If' I 
I assume that O-roles are assigned locally to XPs that the verb M-commands, where by 
'assigned locally' I mean assigned within the maximal projection of the xO category 
containing the verb. It follows that V -to-Pr movement is obligatory. I also assume that 0-
roles are assigned compositionally (Fukui (1986), Grimshaw (1990» , going from 
innennost to outermost constituents. The argument structure associated with verbs is thus 
represented as follows: 
where 93 is assigned to the complement of V in V'; 92 to the argument in [Spec, V); and 
91 to the argument in [Spec, Prj. 
With regard to case theory, I assume that case is also assigned locally under M­
command by xO categories. In languages such as English the Agr element of I (or 
possibly a higher Agr category, but in any case not Pr) assigns nominative case to the NP 
in [Spec, 1]. Hence movement of the 'internal' subject in [Spec, Prj to [Spec, I] is, in 
effect, obligatory, as proposed by Kuroda ( 1986), Fukui ( 1986), and others. Accusative 
case is assigned by V to the NP in [Spt:c, V) and dative case to NPs in complement 
position. It has been shown by Bailyn and Rubin (1990) that instrumental case in Russian 
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is assigned by PrO· 
If objects are generated in [Spec, V], then all movement operations apart from 
adjunction can be restricted to just two kinds: (i) head-to-head; (il) spec-to-spec. 
Movement is thus structure-preserving in the extremely strong sense that not only are 
categories only pennitted to move to positions where categories of the same type are 
permitted, but categories can only move between functional positions of the same kind 
I tum now to empirical arguments that demonstrate the need for the category Pr, 
together with the assumption that objects originate in [Spec, VJ. Modifying Travis (1988) 
somewhat, let us make the following fairly restrictive assumptions concerning the structure 
and licensing of adverb phrases: (i) AdvPs are X'-adjuncts licensed by an xO head; (il) 
each head licenses one and only one type of AdvP. If it could be shown that there was an 
adverb type in the appropriate position for which there was no licensing head, and if it 
could be shown that Pr was a plausible licenser for adverbs of this type, then it could 
reasonably be concluded that Pr exists. Consider in this light the fact that certain manner 
adverbs in English can only occur in post-verbal position: 
(15) a. John learned French perfectly. 
b. Bill recited his Jines poorly. 
c. Mary plays the violin beautifully. 
(16) a. *John perfectly learned French. 
b. *Bill poorly recited his lines. 
c. *Mary beautifully plays the violin. 
while other manner adverbs occur in both positions: 
( 17) a. John learned French immediately. 
b. Bill recited his Jines slowly. 
c. Mary will play the vioJin soon. 
(18) a. John immediately learned French. 
b. Bill slowly recited his Jines. 
c. Mary will soon play the vioJin. 
These two types can cooccur with one another, but cannot be interchanged: 
(19) a. John immediately learned French perfectly. 
b. John learned French pelfectly (almost) immediately. 
(20) a. *John perfectly learned French immediately. 
b. *John learned French immediately perfectly. (modulo Heavy-Constituent Shift) 
This strongly suggests that they are licensed by different categories. The problem is that 
there are at least two further distinct adverb types in English (making a total of four), none 
of which can be interchanged: 
(21 )  a. Oearly, John will probably immediately learn French perfectly. 
b. *Oearly, John will immediately probably learn French perfectly. 
c. *Immediately, John will probably clearly learn French perfectly. 
d *Oearly, John will pelfectly immediately learn French probably. 
etc. 
Since the only three categories available as licensers are V, I and C, either another licenser 
is needed or we must assume that the two types of manner adverb discussed above are both 
licensed by V. It is shown in Bowers (1991) that the latter assumption is untenable. But if 
adverbs such as perfectly are licensed by V and adverbs such as immediately by Pr, then 
their behavior follows immediately, as can be seen by examining the following structures: 
(22) IP 
NP l' 
r Pi'P 
NP 
: AcIVP Pr' (AdvP) Yf 
cpricldy lj 
NP I ' (AdvP) I 
Johni will Ci French . (perfectly) (quickly) 
The fact that perfectly can only appear in post-verbal position is now explained 
automatically by virtue of V -raising into Pr, which ensures that the verb is always to the left 
of the adverb, regardless of where it is generated in D-structure. Adverbs such as quickly, 
in contrast, can appear either as left Pr' adjuncts or as right Pr' adjuncts, hence either to the 
left or to the right ofVP. The fact that the two adverb types can't exchange positions 
follows from the fact that they are licensed by different heads. 
This analysis also makes a further COITeCt prediction concerning the distribution of 
perfectly, namely, that it can appear either to the left or to the right of a complement: 
(23) a. John spoke French intimately to Mary. 
b. John spoke French to Mary intimately. 
(24) a. Mary jumped the horse perfectly over the last fence. 
b. Mary jumped the horse over the last fence perfectly. 
This fact also rules out the possibility of analyzing perfectly-type adverbs as complements, 
since they would then be unable to cooccur with PP complements. 
Consider, finally, the well-known fact that adverbs in English resist being placed 
between a verb and its direct object, though not between a verb and a PP-complement: 
(25) a. John spoke French intimately to Mary. 
b. *John spoke intimately French to Mary. 
c. John spoke to Mary intimately. 
d John spoke intimately to Mary. 
Following Stowell (1981), this restriction on the placement of adverbs in English is usually 
accounted for in the literature by means of the so-called "adjacency requirement" on case­
assignment, which stipulates basically that accusative case can only be assigned by the verb 
to a NP that it is adjacent to. Apart from the inherent implausibility of restricting case­
assignment in this way, there are at least two empirical arguments against such an 
approach. First, adjacency is not a general requirement for case-assignment, even in 
English, since adverbs can occur quite freely between the subject and the 10 head that 
assigns it nominative case: 
(26) John certainly will win the race. 
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Second, the adjacency requirement simply doem't hold in many languages, even in 
typologically quite similar languages such as French (see Bowers (1991), §3.2. 1 ., for 
further discussion): 
(27) Jean parle souvent Ie francais. 
Hence all that remains of the adjacency requirement is a language-specific condition on 
assignment of just a single case, namely, accusative, hardly an explanatory theory. 
In the theory proposed here, in contrast, this restriction on the occmrence of adverbs 
can be explained in pmely structural tenns. Fmt of all, the fact that V-licensed adverbs 
such as pe1/ectly cannot occur between the verb and its direct object follows immediately 
from the assumption that these adverbs are V'-adjuncts, together with the linked 
hypotheses that direct objects are in [Spec, V] and that the verb raises obligatorily into PrO. 
These assumptions jointly ensure that there is simply no way of generating an adverb of 
this type between the verb and its object in English. Second, these same assumptions 
ensure that it is impossible to generate adverbs licensed by any other head between the verb 
and its object Thus a Pr-licensed adverb, for example, will be generable either to the left 
of the raised verb or to the right of the whole VP complement of PrO, but not in any other 
position. The possible positions for adverbs pennitted by this theory are indicated in the 
following structure for (21)  a.: 
(28) 
AdVP c (AdvP) 
IP 
cl Y 
NP �_v--�r�_:t�------------------�(A�dv� 
r NP :::
_
P
_�e(��--------� 
J � T �:: JOM probably will e quO y learn French �y Y 
FInally, the fact that other complements of the verb cannot be ordered between the verb and 
the direct object: 
(29) a. *John spoke to Mary French. 
b. *Mary persuaded to leave John. 
c. *The lions ate raw the meat. 
d. *Sue gave to Bill a book. 
e. *Mary persuaded that he should rest Bill. 
is also explainable in pmely structural tenns, given the analysis proposed here. In fact, all 
the ordering properties attributed to the adjacency condition on case assignment reduce to a 
single structural property of English, namely, that it is Spec-initial. 
Another significant consequence of the claim that subjects and objects are structurally 
parallel is the following. Since Spec positions can in general be e'-positions, it should be 
the case that object position, as well as subject position, is a possible e'-position. In fact, 
Postal and Pullum (1988) have argued that one of the crucial tests for a a'-position, 
namely, occurence of expletives, holds for object position as well as subject position. This 
in t1ml makes it possible, contrary to the cmrent VIeW, to have raising-to-object (RO), as 
well as raising-to-subject (RS), without violating the a-Criterion. An important empirical 
argument in support of RO can be derived from the facts of so-called "quantifier floating" 
in English and other languages. The basic observation, due originally to Maling (1976), is 
that certain quantifiers can "float" to the right of the NP they modify under two conditions: 
(i) if the NP is a subject; (ii) if it is an object that has a predicative complement following it. 
Crucially, quantifier floating is not possible from objects that lack a predicative 
complement: 
(30) a. The men will all leave. 
b. We consider the men all fools/totally crazy. 
c. *1 saw the men all. 
d. *The men were arrested all. 
e. *The men arrived all. 
These facts can be elegantly explained under the following assumptions: 
(31 )  i. Floated quantifiers produced by leftward movement of NP (Sportiche (1988». 
ii. Raising to object (RO) exists. 
iii. Q is adjoined only to PrP and IP. 
As shown in (32) a., a stranded quantifier is always possible in subject position, since 
subjects always move from [Spec, V] to [Spec, Pr]; more importantly, the possibility of a 
stranded quantifier in object position also follows if RO exists, as shown in (32) b.: 
(32) a. [IP the menl [r will [PrP all [PrP t11Pr' leave2 [YP tV]]]]] 
b. [IP •.. [PrP we [pt consider 1 [vp the men2 [V t1 [PrP all [PrP t21Pr' e 
fools]]]]]]]] 
Floating from an object which lacks a complement, as in example (30) c., is ruled out, 
because the object has not been moved. The fact that floated quantifiers are prohibited in 
post-verbal position in passives and unaccusatives, as shown by examples (30) d. and e., 
follows from assumption (31 )  iii., which prohibits Q from being adjoined to VP. 
Fmally, if this analysis is correct, then we would expect floating quantifiers to OCClD" 
with PRO as well as trace, as is indeed the case: 
(33) a. 1 persuaded1 [vp the men2 [V' t1 [IP all IIp PR� to resign]]]] 
b. The teacher ordered the two boys both to pay close attention. 
c. We put1 [vp the students2 [V t1 [PrP each [PrPPR02 [pt e in separate 
desks]]]]] 
d. They retlD"Ded the books all to their owners. 
e. We painted the chairs all red. 
f. The trainer fed the steaks all to the lions. 
These observations lead to the conclusion that goal phrases and dative expressions such as 
those in (33) c., d., and f. must in general be SC complements with a PRO subject. 
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1.3. Indirect Objects and Complements 
It bas often been noted that there is a small class of verbs in English which, though 
transitive in form, cannot be passivized: 
(34) a. John went home/*Home was gone by John. 
b. Mary left the room angry/*The room was left angry (by Mary). 
c. John resembles Bill/*Bill is resembled by John. 
d. The package weighed 10 IbsJ*lO Ibs was weighed by the package. 
e. This book cost $10/*$10 was cost by this book. 
f. The book cost John $10/*John was cost $10 by the book. 
A related phenomenon (commonly refem:d to in the literature as "Visser's generalization", 
though the standard account is Bach (1979» is the fact that transitive subject-control verbs 
lack passives: 
(35) a. *John is impressed (by Bill) as pompous. 
b. *The boys were made a good mother (by Aunt Mary). 
c. *The kids were failed (by Max) as a father. 
d. *The men were struck by the idea as nonsense. 
e. *The men were promised (by Frank) to leave. 
Interestingly, it has been observed by Maling (1976) that the very same verbs that don't 
passivize also don't pennit floated quantifiers associated with their objects: 
(36) a. *He impresses his friends all as pompous. 
b. * Aunt Mary made the boys all a good mother. 
c. *Max failed the kids all as a father. 
d. *The idea struck the men all as nonsense. 
e. *Frank promised the men all to leave. 
Clearly, this can't be an accident, suggesting that there is a structw'al difference between 
direct objects and indirect objects. Let's assume the following structures for sentences with 
persuatk and promise, respectively: 
(3
7
) a. 
NP PrP __ -Pr---_� 
W NY ;_p_ ..... Y'_--..!. 
JoIm; -L �j I PRof'lO lea .. 
b. 
r; NP � Vl 
I. � V' IP Jgj I Jolini pronuse r PROj to leave 
Recalling from the previous section that only spec-to-spec movement is pennit1ed, Visser's 
generalization follows immediately, since only in the case of perSUlJl1e is there an NP in 
[Spec, V]. This analysis can also be used to explain the control properties of these verbs: 
(38) a. Johni persuaded Maryj [pRO*i/j to leave] 
b. Johni promised Maryj [pROiJ*j to leave] 
Suppose that the basic constraint on control is simply that PRO must be controlled by the 
nearest c-commanding NP. The control properties indicated in (38) follow at once. 
Maling's observation concerning quantifier floating is simply a corollary of this solution to 
the control problem, since only in (37) a. does the apparent object c-command the floating 
quantifier in the complement clause. The remaining examples in (35) are exactly like (37) 
b. in structure except that they contain a SC complement with a PRO subject. An example 
such as (36) d. would therefore be represented as follows: 
(39) 
NP h' 
Vi f>fIr PROi as nonsense f me e 
. At this point we have pretty much deduced the general argument structure (1) (repeated 
below), proposed at the outset: 
objec erne y' (or V") 
(accusative) Y' complement/oblique 
V indirect object/goal 
(dative) 
Further support for the correctness of this structure can be derived from the fact that there 
are sentences containing all three arguments, a direct object, indirect object and SC or 
sentential complement: 
(41) a. They feed the meati to the lions PROi raw. 
b. John put the patienti in bedPROi drunk. (cited in Roberts ( 1988, 708, n. 3) 
c. I sent Johni to the store PROj to get the paper. 
As predicted, the direct object, rather than the indirect object, controls the PRO subject of 
the complement. 
I conclude by discussing the interaction of RO with dative arguments and V-licensed 
adverbs. It has been argued that the latter both occur in positions subordinate to, and to the 
right of, the direct object. Therefore, if RO exists, the order of these elements must be as 
follows: 
(42) V -Object-(Adverb )-(Dative )-Complement 
Remarkably, this prediction is borne out by the facts, as the following data shows: 
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(43) a. *We proclaimed to the public John to be a hero. 
b. We proclaimed John to the public to be a hero. 
c. *We proclaimed sincerely John to be a hero. 
d We proclaimed John sincerely to be a hero. 
e. *We proclaimed sincerely to the public John to be a hero. 
f. We proclaimed John sincerely to the public to be a hero. 
(44) a. *They represented to the Dean Mary as a genuine linguist. 
b. They represented Mary to the Dean as a genuine linguist. 
c. *They represented seriously Mary as a genuine linguist. 
d They represented Mary seriously as a genuine linguist. 
e. *They represented seriously to the Dean Mary as a genuine linguist. 
f. They represented Mary seriously to the Dean as a genuine linguist. 
(45) a. *We proved to the authorities Smith to be the thief. 
b. We proved Smith to the authorities to be the thief. 
c. *We proved conclusively Smith to be the thief. 
d We proved Smith conclusively to be the thief. 
e. *We proved conclusively to the authorities Smith to be the thief. 
f. We proved Smith conclusively to the authorities to be the thief. 
Historically, one of the main objections to admitting RO as a possible operation in the 
theory of grammar was the fact that it appeared to be string vacuous. As the following 
derivation shows, this particular objection to RO no longer carries any force: 
NP 
a genuirle linguist 
Returning finally to the impassivizable verbs in (34), D01e that in each case there is at 
least some independent evidence in support of the view that the apparent direct object is 
really an underlying dative argument. The apparent object in examples (34) a. and b. is 
clearly a directional complement that idiosynaatically lacks a preposition, as revealed by 
related examples such as John went to his/the home (n.b. * John went his/the Iwme), 
Mary went out of/away from the room, etc. The dative character of the apparent object in 
(34) c. shows up in related nominal forms such as John's resemblance to Bill/the 
resemblance of John to Bill. In the case of examples (34) d and e. it seems more 
plausible to suppose that the measure expressions 10 lbs. and $10 are predicates of a SC 
complement and example (34) f. further supprts this hypothesis, since the (impassivizable) 
dative object optionally occurs to the left of the measure expression. 
2. The Semantics of Sentences 
Classical theories of logical semantics assume just two basic types: the type of entities, 
designated by the symbol 'e', and the type of propositions, designated by the symbol 't'. 
All other types are derived from these two. Properties are not primitives in such a theory, 
but rather are reconstructed as propositional functions (I-place predicates, or intransitive 
verbs), of type <e,t>, which combine with entity expressions to form propositions. 2-
place predicates, or transitive verbs, are expressions of type <e,<e,t» , i.e. an expression 
that combines with an entity expression to form an intransitive verb (which in tum 
combines with an entity expression to form a proposition). In this way, expressions with 
any arbitrary number of arguments can be represented, as well as other types of 
expressions, such as sentence modifiers (of type <t,t» , nominal modifiers (of type <e,e», 
and so forth. The only problem with adopting the classical type theory as a theory of 
natural language semantics is, as has frequently been noted, that the types provided by the 
semantics don't necessarily map onto the syntactically motivated categories of natural 
language in any simple or transparent fashion. Take, for example, a standard set of 
phrase-structure rules such as the following: 
(46) a. S -> NP VP 
b. VP -> V 
c. VP -> V NP 
How do the types of classical semantics relate to the categories provided by these rules? 
The category S obviously corresponds to expressions of type t, while VP-expressions are 
uniformly of type <e,t>. Verbs are of different types, such as <e,t> or <e,<e,t» , 
depending on how many arguments they require. The relation between classical type 
theory and the syntactic representations proposed here, on the other hand, is quite opaque. 
The category PrP would of course correspond to the type t of propositions and the category 
VP to the type <e,t> of propositional functions. However, the intervening categories Pr 
and Pr' correspond to nothing at all in the semantics. Of course, one can always stipulate 
in an ad hoc fashion the relation between syntactic rules and semantic types, but 
considerations of leamability strongly suggest that the principles connecting syntax and 
logical form should be simple and universal. The strongest possible hypothesis would be 
that, aside from the syntactic and semantic properties of specific lexical items, the child 
must learn nothing concerning the relation between syntactic rules and categories and 
semantic types, the basic mapping being detennined by principles of UG. 
I tum now to a rather different approach to the logical semantics of natural language. 
Following Chierchia (1985, 1989), I will assume that the representations of logical fonn 
are drawn from a multisorted first-order language with four basic sorts: u, p, 1t, e (the 
universal sort), plus the predication relation u: 1t -> <e,p> and its inverse ("): <c,p> -> 
1t. P is the type of propositions; 1t is the type of properties; and u is the type of basic 
entities. Since properties and propositions are basic types in this theory, there is no direct 
connection between them, as there is in the classical theory. Therefore in order to predicate 
a property of some entity to produce a proposition, it is fIrSt necessary to turn that property 
into a propositional function, i.e. a ''Fregean" unsaturated structure that must combine with 
an entity expression to form a proposition. That is precisely the function of the predication 
operation 'v, which maps property expressions onto propositional functions of type 
<c,p>. (The inverse operation '(")', which might be tenned 'nominalization', maps 
propositional functions onto properties; it will not concern us further here.) This 
propositional function then combines with another expression to form an expression of 
type p, a proposition. 
Given this ontology, there is a straightforward correspondence between the semantics of 
predication and the syntax of predication proposed in this paper. Assume that the semantic 
function of Pr is to map properties (expressions of type 1t) into propositional functions 
(expressions of type <c,p». In short, assume that the translation of Pr in If is simply 'v. 
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Assume in addition that phrases of category VP map onto expressions of type 1t, as do 
predicate APs, NPs and PPS. It follows that if r is the translation of a phrase of category 
YP, of type 1t (regardless of its syntactic category), then the translation of [Pr' Pr YP] is 
simply Ur, of type <c,p>, and the translation of PrP is Uru (u an individual of any sort), of 
type p. There is thus a straightforward, one-to-one mapping between the categories of 
syntax and the types of their translations in logical fonn. Given a property semantics of 
this kind, it immediately becomes possible to assign a precise meaning in logical fonn to 
the hypothesized functional category Pr and to its X-bar projections Pr' and PrP. 
Phrases of the category PrP involve what might be termed 'primary predication', to 
which we have now given a fonnally precise definition at the level of If. Phrases of 
category VP, on the other hand, we have suggested are properties, expressions of type 1t. 
These property expressions can themselves contain one or more arguments and it was 
argued in § 1 .2. that the fonnation of PrP and the fonnation of transitive VP are fonnally 
parallel in that both involve combining a NP with some X' -phrase to fonn a new phrase of 
category XP. To account for this parallelism at the semantic level, I assume that a 
transitive V' is of type <e,n>, what might be termed a 'property function', meaning that it 
must combine with some expression to fonn a property expression. I have suggested that 
the process by which transitive VPs are formed might appropriately be referred to as 
'secondary predication'. Notice, however, that even though they are fonnally parallel in 
certain respects, there are fundamental differences between PrP and VP. A PrP is what 
Chomsky (1986) has termed a "complete functional complex" (CFC), meaning that it can 
stand on its own as a complete 'thought', or 'information unit', as it is tenned in Chierchia 
and Turner (1988). A transitive VP, in contrast, is not a CFC in this sense. This 
difference is formally accounted for here by virtue of the fact that propositions are of type 
p, and therefore have truth-values, whereas transitive verbs, which are of type 1t, do not. 
The themy proposed here thus explains both the formal parallels between primary and 
secondary predication, as well as their fundamental differences. 
At this point, let me summarize the previous discussion by comparing the different types 
of entities assumed in the classical theory and Chierchia's property theory, along with the 
kinds of syntactic categories they naturally map onto: 
(47) a. 
entities: e 
propositions: t 
properties: <e,t> 
b. 
basic entities: u predication (U): <11:, <c,p» 
propositions: p nominalization (n): <<c,p>, 1t> 
properties:7t 
propositional functions: <c,p> 
S <-> t 
IV <-><c,t> 
TV <-> <C, <c,t» 
TV rr <-> <c, <c, <e,t»> 
PrP<-> p 
Pr' <-> <c,p> 
Pr <-> u: 1t -> <c,p> 
VP<-> 7t 
intrV <->7t 
trans V <-> <C,n> 
ditrans V <-> <c,<c,1t» 
pred NP <-> 7t 
Putting the syntax proposed in § 1 together with the semantics just discussed, propositions 
will universally have the following structure and type assignments: 
(48) 
subject: 
complement 
A dittansitive sentence such as John will give a book to Mary will therefore have the 
following structure, ttanslations and type assignments: 
(49) 
e 
IP 
r �p, U[(give(m»(b)]G), p �, U[(give(m»(b)](x), <c,p> 
Pi, U 
I e will Jolin 
If any relation is semantic, it is surely the predication relation. Almost without 
exception, model theoretic accounts of predication have adopted the ''Fregean'' view that the 
act of predication consists of "saturating" or "completing" structures that are inherently 
"unsaturated" or "incomplete". (But see e.g. Aczel (1980), Bealer (1982), Jubien (1985), 
for an alternative, non-"Fregean" approach to predication.) At the same time, there appears 
to be strong semantic evidence (Chierchia (1984, 1985, 1989), Chierchia and Turner 
(1988) that properties in natural language cannot simply be identified with propositional 
functions, but must be able to function as individuals, as well. If the arguments discussed 
so far are correct, then it turns out, quite remarkably, that the syntactically motivated 
structures required to support a structural theory of predication match up in a simple, 
"transparent" fashion with the types of entities and operations required in a richer logical 
language of the sort envisioned by Chierchia. It will be demonstrated shortly that similar 
results can be achieved in the case of nominal structures, a remarkable, though surely not 
surprising result A priori, it seems quite unlikely that the structural representations 
required to represent the syntactic phenomena of natural language will turn out to be related 
in random and essentially unpredictable ways to the types and operations required to 
support an explicit semantics for natural language. Probably, everyone would assent to the 
assumption that an adequate semantic theory must be compositional. The requirement of 
compositionality ensures that each syntactic rule or substructure be matched by a 
corresponding semantic rule or type. However, as Chierchia and Turner (1988, 277) note, 
"everything else being equal. one would prefer not to have to specify for any given 
grammar, the pairing of syntactic rules with the corresponding semantic one , on a case-by­
case basis. One would like such a pairing to follow from general principles." 
The considerations put forward thus far strongly suggest that the pairing of syntactic 
and semantic rules is in fact quite general and universal. I have argued, in particular, that 
the basic structural relations in sentences are universally specifiable by applying an 
extremely restricted version of X'_theory to a small number of lexical and functional 
categories. The pairing of syntactic categories with semantic types and of syntactic 
relations with semantic operations is, I claim, fixed within very nanow limits by the 
principles of universal grammar. Specifically, I have tried to show that the category 'Pr', 
whose translation is simply 'v, along with its phrasal projections, provides a uniform 
account of the syntax and semantics of every kind of predication relation encountered in 
15  
16 
natural language. Given this category and its ttanslation in If, the structul'e and 
interpretation of the phrasal categories it can project are cmnpletely determined by the 
principles of X' -theory in the syntax and by the principle of functional application in the 
semantics. 
Similarly, I have shown that expressions of the category VP, unifonnly paired with 
properties (expressions of type 'It), have an asymmetrical structure, mirrored in the 
corresponding logical representations, which is precisely parallel to the structure ofPrP. In 
particular, the so-called direct object asymmetrically c-commands the cmnplements of the 
verb. Semantically, the V' constituent is an unsaturated expression (as is Pr') which yields 
a propeny expression when applied to the direct object constituent. I have tried to show 
that this remarkable parallelism between the internal structure of PrP and VP is empirically 
supported by a wide range of syntactic and semantic considerations. 
The remainder of this paper will be devoted to demonstrating a similar transparency in 
the mapping between the syntactic representation of nominals and their ttanslations in If. 
At the same time, it will be shown that there is a close parallelism between sentences and 
nominals, both in their syntax and in their semantics. The idea that sentences and nominals 
are fundamentally similar in underlying fonn has been of central importance in the 
generative ttadition from its inception. The results of this paper confinn in the sttongest 
possible way the essential cmrectness of that conjecture. 
3. The Syntax of Nominals 
Recent work by Abney (1987), Bowers (1987), and others has clearly established the 
necessity for a functional category O(et) in the nominal system. H, as has been claimed in 
this paper (and in more detail in Bowers (1991», there is a functional category PrP in 
sentences, intermediate between IP and VP, then one might expect to find a corresponding 
intennediate category in nominals. Consider in this light gerundive nominals of the 
following sort: 
(50) a. [p John's [a driving cars so recklessly] is terrifying everyone] 
b. [p This [a singing songs] must stop at once] 
It has been demonstrated by Abney (1987) and Bowers (1987), following Chomsky 
(1970) and Jackendoff (1977), that the a-phrases in (50) are verbal rather than nominal in 
nature. It follows, given the analysis of direct objects proposed in this paper, that there 
must be some head position for the verb to move to, if the cmrect order of the verb and 
secondary subject is to be generated. This position cannot be 0, because in examples such 
as (SO) b., 0 is already occupied by a demonstrative. It must be the case, therefore, that 0 
has the option of selecting a PrP as its complement: 
(51) [OP this [PrP PRO [Pr' singingi [vp songs [V' q.1]]]] 
Consider next example (50) a. The possessive NP John's is the primary subject of 
singing, hence must originate in [Spec, Pr]: 
(52) [OP[NP eUo' [0 e]£Prp John £Pc' singingi [vp songs til]]]] 
Obviously subjects of gerundives do not remain in this position, since they cannot follow 
demonstratives, articles and other realizations of the category 0 in S-structure. 
Funhermore, we already know that [Spec, Pr] is not a position to which case is assigned 
Hence a NP in that position must move to a position where it can receive case. The only 
possible position it can move to is [Spec, DP], where it will, we assume, be assigned 
genitive case, thereby satisfying the Case Filter. Note the parallel between this movement 
and movement from [Spec, Pr] to [Spec, I].2 
3.1. The category Nm. 
Having established that D is capable of selecting the intermediate level functional category 
PrP and that there must be movement from [Spec, Pr] to [Spec, D], let us consider whether 
there might be a corresponding intermediate level functional category in pure nominal 
fanns. The null hypothesis is that the SbUctme of nominals is precisely parallel to that of 
sentences. Let us assume therefore that there is an intermediate functional category 'Nm' 
whose Spec position cmresponds to the primuy subject position in sentences and which 
takes as its complement the category NP. We would then have the following canonical D­
structure representation for nominals: 
(53) 
possessor: NP 
NmP 
subject: NP Bin' 
Nfif 
object: NP 
NP 
N' XP complement 
It was shown in § 1.2 that the existence of a special class of modifiers, licensed neither by 
V nor by I, could be used to justify positing the intermediate category Pr. I shall now 
show that the class of weak determiners, in the sense of Milsark (1974) and Barwise and Cooper (1981), provides a similar argument in support of the existence of Nm. It has been 
argued on syntactic grounds in Bowers (1975, 1987) that there are two classes of 
quantifiers in English. The first class, among which are all, every, each, both, some, 
neither and any, cannot cooccur with a genitive NP, unless it is postposed. These are the 
elements, I hypothesize, that belong to the category D. The second class, among which are 
the numerals and the quantifiers many,few, several and much, cooccur both with 
members ofD and with genitive NPs: 
(54) a. those three books 
b. this one book 
c. the many books 
d. these few books 
e. John's three books 
f. all ten books 
g. every three days 
. h. any five chairs 
Remarkably, the membership of these two classes conesponds almost precisely to the class 
of strong and weak determiners, respectively, suggesting that there are systematic 
differences in syntactic SbUctme cmresponding to the semantic differences between them. 
The observations in Bowers (1987) provide independent support for this view. There it 
was shown that the class of elements that characteristically exhibit SlH:alled "specificity 
effects" are just the determiners of Class I, i.e. the strong determiners, while the members 
of Class n typically do not exhibit such effects. It was argued that this difference can be 
explained in tenns of the "Barriers" theory if it is assumed that the Class I, but not the 
Class n, determiners belong to the category D. 
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The two types of detenniner differ syntactically in other ways as well. Members of the 
first class can never be modified by the special degree elements that modify adjectives and 
adverbs, while members of the second class (where semantically interpretable) can be: 
(55) a. • so every that .. 
b. ·very each 
c. ·too all to ••• 
(56) a. so many that. . .  
b. very few 
c. too much to ... 
In addition, determiners of the first class can never be used predicatively, whereas 
detenniners of the second class typically can: 
(57) a. *The men were every. 
b. ·The books were all. 
c. ·John is each. 
(58) a. The soldiers were few (in number). 
b. The books were many (in number). 
c. The cars were three (in number). 
All of these facts can be explained if it is assumed that the Class II determiners are simply 
AP modifiers. Categorizing the weak determiners as adjectives also has the advantage that 
virtually all of the complex derived quantifiers discussed in Keenan ( 1988) will 
automatically be generated in the syntax under standard assumptions concerning the 
structure of AP: 
(59) infinitely/countably/just finitely many, more male than female, at least as many 
male as female, at least n, fewer than n, approximately n, more • . .  than ... , at least as 
many ... as . . .  , etc. 
In Bowers (1987) it was suggested that these determiners were simply attributive APs, 
hence modifiers of N'. However, this fails to account for the fact that they must always 
occur fmt in a sequence of APs: 
(60) a. the many polite young men 
b. ·the polite many young men 
c. ·the polite young many men 
If, on the other hand, weak determiners are assumed to be Nm' modifiers, parallel to the 
Pr' modifiers discussed in § 1 .2., this result follows automatically. Another argument 
against my earlier analysis can be derived from the fact that attributive adjectives generally 
pennit replacement of the following N' constituent with the pro-form one, whereas weak 
detenniners don't: 
(61) a. John has good students, while Bill has lousy ones. 
b. John has many students, while Bill has few (·ones). 
Still another observation which supports this analysis is the fact that determiners licensed 
by Nm cannot occur in gerundive nominals: 
(62) *These three (many, few, etc.) singing songs (of John's) must cease. 
whereas they can occur in derived nominals: 
(63) Those three proofs of the theorem of John's are world famous.  
If, as proposed above, the intennediate categmy in gerundives is PrP, while derived 
nominals contain a NmP complement to 0, this result also follows automatically.3 
Finally, a strong argument for distinguishing attributive APs and weak detenniners 
structurally can be derived from Chinese. In Chinese, attributive APs occur with the 
modification marlcer -de, while weak determiners must occur with a special class of 
elements traditionally called "classifiers": 
(64) nei san-ben/*de hen hao-del*ben shu 
those three-cl very good-mod books 
As (64) shows, the position of the modification marker and the classiflCl' cannot be 
interchanged., a fact which can be explained under the proposed analysis if it is assumed 
that the classifiers are phonetic realizations of Nm, while the modification marlcer -de is 
generally associated with X-modifiers, and specifically with N'-modifiers.4 
We may tentatively conclude then that the hypothesized intennediate categmy Nm exists 
and that the weak quantifiers are to be analyzed as AP modiflCl'S of Nm', licensed by Nm. 
Hence the structure of a phrase such as these three good books would be represented as 
follows: 
(65) � 
D" �� N '  
liP :; IrQ!' 11 I J\P 
1ks three gok these e 
3.2. Argument positions in the nominal 
Now let's consider the argument positions that are available in structures of the sort we 
have posited for nominals. Again, the null hypothesis is that the structure of sentences and 
nominals is precisely parallel Let us assume therefore, as has already been indicated in 
(53), that the primary subject position is [Spec, Nm), the secondary subject position is 
[Spec, N] and that possessive NPs are base generated in [Spec, 0). Obviously the subject 
and object arguments of NP never occur overtly in S-structure in these positions. This 
result can be derived by assuming that neither [Spec, N] nor [Spec, Nm) is a case-marlced 
position in English. Thus structures of the form *[NmP John three [NP the theorem 
proofs)) will never be generated in the S)'Dtax in S-Str'Ucture. How can subjects and 
objects be realized in S-Str'Ucture in nominals? In two ways: as genitive NPs in [Spec, 0) 
and as objects of the preposition of. 5 Thus it is a well-known fact that a nominal such as 
John's picture is three-ways ambiguous, meaning either (i) 'the picture of John'; (ii) 'the 
picture by John'; or (iii) 'the picture that John has'. This follows from our assumptions. 
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In order to be grammatical, a OP with a base-generated subject or object will have to move 
to [Spec, 0] (if it is not already filled with a possessive) to be case-marked. Since there is 
only one case-marked position in nominals, the fact that only one argument can be overtly 
realized in S-structure follows immediately. Note the parallel between obligatory 
movement of arguments to [Spec, IP] in sentences and obligatory movement to [Spec, OP] 
in nominals, in both instances for case-theoretic reasons. 
Which positions in the nominal are potential non-theta positions? Obviously [Spec, 0] 
is. Apparently [Spec, Nm] is also a possible non-theta position, since the internal 
argument of unaccusatives also shows up in the genitive case: the ball's movement, 
Mary's appearance, etc.: 
(66) [OP Mary's [NmP t' Nm [NP t appearance]]] 
The Spec position in NP, on the other hand, is evidently not a non-9 position, as is shown 
by the well-known observation « Chomsky (197 1» that raising constructions are 
impossible in derived nominal fonns: 
(67) a. *[op John's [NmP ttl Nm £Np t' appearance [t to have left]]]] 
b. *Mary's belief [t to have disappeared] 
whereas the corresponding conbOl constructions are fine: 
(68) [OP John's [NmP t Nm [NP attempt [PRO to leave]]]] 
Notice that this explanation for the lack of raising constructions in nominals is only 
available if we extend the 'unaccusative' derivation of RS constructions proposed in 
Bowers (1991) to nominal structures as well. If John in (67) a. were moved directly from 
the complement to [Spec, Nm], no violation of the 1beta Criterion would reswL The 
offending trace in (67) a. must therefore be t'. In other words, RO is not permitted in 
nominals. In contrast, raising is possible in gerundives, as expected, since gerundives 
contain PrP rather than NmP: 
(69) a. Mary's happening to stumble across the truth was fortunate indeed. 
b. I doubt whether Mary's being believed to have disappeared made much 
difference. 
The second way in which the arguments of a noun can be expressed overtly in English 
is in a PP complemenL Typically objects occur with of and agents with either by or of, 
the fonner being preferable, especially if there is more than one PP-argument, though in 
other languages such as Spanish any number of phrases with de (the equivalent of English 
of) are possible (cf. Mallen ( 1989), for extensive discussion). This yields data such as the 
following: 
(70) a. the enemy's destruction of the city 
b. the destruction of/by the enemy 
c. ?the destruction of the enemy of the city 
d the destruction of the city by the enemy 
e. the movement of/*by the ball down the hill 
Note that the subjects of unaccusative nouns can also optionally appear with of. 
\I 1) a. the appearance of Mary 
b. the movement of the ball 
It bas been suggested that the of that marks the object in these examples is inserted to 
satisfy the Case Filter, assuming that Nouns are not case-assigners. An argument in 
support of this view is that together with assumption that [Spec, N] is an obligatory theta 
position, it explains why there are no ECM complements of the raising type in nominals: 
(12) a. *my belief of John to be the culprit 
b. *John's belief to be the culprit 
If this analysis is correct, then of cannot itself be a prepositional case-assigner, since PPs 
only occur in complement position. I shall assume therefore, following Lamontagne and 
Travis (1987), that there is a functional category K (=case), whose head can be optionally 
realized as ofin English in [Spec, N]: 
(13) DP 
NP 
the enemy's 
If object NPs are case-marked in [Spec, N], then it follows that Nouns must raise to Nm, 
precisely parallel to the raising of Verbs to Pr in sentences. 
This analysis is quite appealing, though there are some potential problems. Note first 
that an AP modifier of N' must somehow be prevented from being stranded by the raising 
of the head Noun, since unmodified APs can never occur to the right of an object PP: *the 
enemy's destruction of the city violent/the enemy's violent destruction of the city. 
Second, there is a mass of empirical evidence (see Radford (1988), for an extensive 
summary of the arguments) suggesting that PP-arguments of the noun must be generated 
within N', while PP adjuncts must be adjoined to N'. One major piece of evidence in 
support of this conclusion is the fact that PP-arguments must precede PP-adjuncts: 
(14) a. student of Physics with long hair 
b. *a student with long hair of Physics 
However, this observation is perfectly consistent with the existence of N-Raising, since an 
NP in [Spec, N] will always precede an N' adjunct in any case. As for the first problem, I 
will take care of it by showing that there are two types of Nouns: those that raise and those 
that don't Nouns of the first type take a real object and only occur with Nm' modifiers, 
while nouns of the second type take an of phrase which is really a PP-complement and can 
occur with both Nm' and N' modifiers. For nouns of the first type, the correct surface 
order is derived by N-to-Nm movement For nouns of the second type, the problem 
simply doesn't arise. 
3.3. Action nominals vs. result nominals 
The idea that some nouns raise while others don't arise is suggested by the familiar 
observation that the secondary subjects of action nominals can generally occur as genitives, 
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while the secondary subjects of result nominals can't: 
(75) a. the destruction of the city/the city's destruction 
b. the publication of the article in the Timeslthe article's pUblication in the Tunes 
(76) a. the student of Chemistryl*Chemistry's student 
b. the proof of the theorem in the journa1/*the theorem's proof in the journal 
This contrast can be explained if we assume that the object of an action nOOlinal is a real 
secondary subject, generated in [Spec, NJ, while the apparent object of a result nominal is 
actually a SC PP-cOOlplement of N. Example (75) b. would then be derived as follows: 
(77) Of 
NP' D' 
D 
NP 
e e e 
4' If' 
N""mP 
N"m' Nfu' lie NP 
th . 1 1 bli f. e e artIC e pu catton 
� I I 
I I 
N' 
PP 
I 
in the Times 
If the secondary subject the article fails to be case-marked by of, then it must move 
successively into [Spec, Nm] and [Spec, D], producing the second phrase in (75) b. The 
structure of (76) b., in contrast, is as follows: 
(78) 
NP 
OP 
0' 
D N:mP 
NP N"m' 
Nm 1l 
PP 
e die 1 I e �f H' PRO of !'J: theorem in the'journal 
As is immediately apparent, NP-movement is impossible in this structure. I shall return 
shortly to the question of why the head noun also fails to move to Nm. 
Now consider the adjectival modifiers that are possible with these nominaJizations: 
(79) a. The rapid/*interesting publication of the article in the Tunes. 
b. The *rapidlinteresting proof of the theorem in the journal. 
The adjective interesting in (79) b. is an N-modifier, as shown by the fact that it permits 
one-pronominalization: 
(80) John has an interesting proof of the theorem in this journal, but Mary has an even 
more interesting one in that journal. 
The adjective rapid in (79) a., in contrast, does not permit one-pronominalization of any 
kind: 
(81 ) a. *We prefer rapid publication of the article in the Times to slow one in the 
Herald. 
b. *We were disappointed by the rapid publication of Mary's article and the slow 
one of John's. 
As was shown earlier, one-pronominalization is a property of N'-modifiers, but not of 
Nm'-modifiers. Hence it can be concluded that AP modifiers of action nominals are Nm'­
modifiers, whereas AP modifiers of result nominals are N'-modifiers. This analysis is 
confirmed by the fact that in the corresponding sentences a Nm'-modifier of an action 
nominal translates naturally into a Pr' adverbial modifier, whereas the same is not true for 
result nominals: 
(82) a. They rapidly published John's article in the Times. 
b. *John interestingly proved the theorem. 
One crucial question remains: why does the head noun raise to Nm in action nominals 
but not in result nominals? Suppose that action nominals assign 9-roles in exactly the same 
way that verbs do, while basic nouns and result nominals simply do not assign 9-roles at 
all.6 The result would be that action nominals would have to raise to Nm for exactly the 
same reason that verbs obligatorily raise to Pr, namely, to assign a 9-role to the primary 
subject in [Spec, N] and [Spec, V], respectively. Basic nouns and result nominals, on the 
other hand, would not raise because they don't have any a-roles to assign. This proposal 
predicts correctly some further differences between action nominals and result nominals. 
First, action nominals should be able to OCCur with PRO subjects, while result nominals 
should not. As Williams (1985) notes, presence of a PRO subject in nominals can be 
tested for by seeing whether a purpose clause is possible, since purpose clauses are known 
to be controlled by SUbjects. The result, as predicted, is that action nominals can occur 
with purpose clauses, hence must have PRO subjects: 
(83) the PRO destruction of the city [pRO to prove a point] 
whereas result nominals and basic nouns cannOt: 
(84) a. *those/John's proofs of the theorem [pRO to prove a point] 
b. *those/John's pictures of Mary [PRO to prove a point] 
Second, since PRO is not case-marked, it can remain in [Spec, Nm], leaving the 
possessive position in [Spec, D] free to take a lexical NP. The existence of such phrases 
has been noted by Williams (1985): 
(85) yesterday's PRO destruction of the city [pRO to prove a point] 
Finally, as Roeper (1987) observes, presence of a PRO subject blocks preposing of objects 
in action nominals: 
(86) *the city's destruction to prove a point 
If this analysis is correct, then it can be concluded, not surprisingly perhaps, that action 
nominals are closer in structure to sentences (and hence to gerundive nominals) than result 
nominals are. Their interpretation is also different Action nominals refer to events, 
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whereas result nominals refer to classes of individuals. How to represent this difference in 
fonnal semantic terms will be discussed in the next section. 
4. The Semantics of Nominals 
If the syntactic analysis of the previous section is correct, then there are three basic kinds of 
nominals whose semantics must be accounted for: (i) nominals with Cass n quantifiers 
only; (ii) nominals with Class I quantiflers (with or without Class n quantifiers in 
addition); (iii) action nominals. Cases (i) and (ii), which apply to basic nouns and result 
nominals, I discuss together; case (iii) I discuss separately. 
4.1 .  Strong and weak determiners 
As a first approximation, Cass I determiners have been identified as strong, in the sense 
of Milsark (1974) and Barwise and Cooper (1981 ), and Class n as weak. Milsark's 
original observation (the "deflniteness restriction", or DR) was that NPs with weak 
determiners occur in post-copular position in this construction with an existential 
interpretation, while NPs with strong determiners, if possible at all, do not have an 
existential interpretation, but rather a "listing" interpretation or else one just identical to the 
corresponding non-existential sentence with the quantified NP in subject position: 
(87) a. There are many/few/two men in the ganien. 
b. There is/are everylthat/most man in the ganien. 
c. Every/that/most man is/are in the ganien. 
Thus (87) a. is interpreted existentially, while (87) b. is either deviant or else interpreted 
just like (87) c. Barwise and Cooper (1981) tried to show that a determiner is weak just in 
case there are properties pand q in its domain such that det p's are p's is true and det q's 
are q is false. A determiner is strong if it is nonweak: it is positive strong if det p's are 
p's is true for all p in the domain of the determiner, negative strong if det p's are p's is 
false for all such p. However, Keenan (1988) argues that the semantic properties of those 
quantifiers that can occur in existential contexts should be derived from a basic property 
that he terms existentiality, since there are trivial determiners that are positive strong (e.g. 
at least zero, zero or more, irifinitely msny or finitely many, etc.) and negative strong (e.g. 
fewer than zero, between seven andfive, neither il'ffinitely many nor finitely many, etc.), 
but which nevertheless occur in existential contexts. A detenniner (e.g. some) is 
existential if sentences of the fonn Det-N-that-be-Pred have the same truth conditions as 
sentences of the fonn Det-N-that-be-Pred-exist. For example, some is existential because 
the following pair of sentences has the same truth conditions: 
(88) a. Some student is a vegetarian. 
b. Some student who is a vegetarian exists. 
A strong determiner such as every, on the other hand, is not existential because (89) b. is 
always true, while (89) a. can be false: 
(89) a. Every student is a vegetarian. 
b. Every student who is a vegetarian exists. 
Keenan apparendy takes existentiality to be a basic property of individual determiners. 
If existentiality were indeed an inherent property of weak determiners, that is to say � if the 
property of existentiality could be shown to be an intrinsic part of the lexical content of 
quantifiers such as many,/ew, and the cardinal numbers, then we could justifiably 
conclude that the explanation for the DR is purely semantic. This, however, is not the 
case, as is shown by another observation due originally to Milsark (1974). Milsark noted 
that NPs with weak: detemliners in subject position are ambiguous between a 
quantificational reading and a cardinal reading. Thus the sentence: 
(90) Many men are in the garden. 
can either mean: (i) 'of the existing men, a large proportion are in the garden', or (ii) ·there 
are many men in the garden'. The latter interpretation is identical to that of the existential 
sentence (87) a. The fonner is quantificational, similar to (87) c., and in this interpretation 
many is not existential. This shows that the property of existentiality is not somehow 
intrinsic to the concept of "many-ness". Rather, it appears to be a semantic property that 
some determiners (the weak: ones) can optionally acquire in the right context, but which 
other detemliners (the strong ones) cannot There are, then, two questions that have to be 
answered: (a) how does the property of existentiality arise?; (b) why can some determiners, 
but not others, acquire it? 
According to the theory proposed here, weak: detemliners are categori7ed as adjectives, 
while strong detenniners belong to the functional category D. Hence all we need in order 
to answer (b) is to suppose that some detemliners belong either to the category A or to the 
category D, while others only belong to the category D. I retmn to this point shortly 
(There could also be detenniners that only belong to the category A; a good candidate 
might be the indefmite determiner a.) To answer (a), we have to show that the property of 
existentiality arises somehow from structures containing adjectival quantifiers and not from 
structures containing D quantifiers. I shall now tty to show that the property of 
existentiality, and hence the DR, can be derived from assumptions (1 ')-(5') (cf. p. 1), 
repeated here for convenience: (1') NPs denote properties and are therefore assigned the 
type 11: in If; (2') the semantic function of NmO (like I¥» is to tmn properties into 
propositional functions, and hence it is translated as ·v, the predication operator; (3') X'­
adjuncts are uniformly translated as modifiers, from which it follows that weak: determiners 
do not change the type of the expressions they modify; (4') the members of D, in contrast, 
following the theory of generalized quantifiers (Montague (1970), Barwise and Cooper 
(1981», map properties onto sets of properties, thereby changing the type of the NmP 
complements they select; (5') if there is no lexical detenniner in D, then it is obligatorily 
interpreted as the existential quantifier , as a default value. Simply stated, the idea is that 
every nominal (that is not a predicate nominal, of course) has to become a generali7ed 
quantifier. If no overt quantifier is available in D, then the propositional function created 
by NmP is turned into the existential generalized quantifier as a default value. The 
nominals all men and two men would thus be derived as follows: 
(90) p 
___ .... ' all_x ["'man(x» = y \1'x['l man(x) ->V y(x» = I lall {men ) I I, <<e,p>,p> 
, 
, allx 
all 
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(9 1) �� lx [two(v man(x)) = y 3x[two(vman(x» -> two(V y(x») = 1 13 { two �mP (men» ) II , <<e,p>,p> \ 
. __ .... ' .... tw.;.;o;.!( man(x», <e,p> 
e 
, two ' man(x), <e,p> 
In support of this analysis, note first that the fact that weak, but not strong, determiners 
have the property of existentiality (from which the properties of intersectivity and symmetry 
follow (Barwise and Cooper (1981), Keenan (1988») is derived from assumptions (3') 
and (5'). Weak determiners are, by hypothesis, syntactically Nm'-adjuncts. Therefore by 
(3') they don't change the type of the propositional function they modify, but rather just 
specify the cardinality of the set in question. By (5'), the empty D must be interpreted as 
the existential quantifier in order to tum its NmP complement into a generalized quantifier. 
Strong determiners, in contrast, are members of D; by hypothesis, they are generalized 
quantifiers, bence in complementary distribution with the existential quantifier. 
Second, the DR follows direcdy from (5'). By hypothesis, Nm converts a NP (of type 
11:) into a propositional function (of type <e, p» . However, since weak determiners are 
Nm' modifiers, they don't change the type of the expressions they modify. Therefore, in 
order for a NP containing only a weak determiner to be converted into a generalized 
quantifier, i.e. an expression that combines with a propositional function to yield a 
proposition, it must first be operated on by the 'default' existential quantifier, as shown 
above in (91). The fact that it happens to be in post-copular position in an existential 
sentence is actually irrelevant, for NPs with weak determiners generally have an existential 
interpretation regardless of what position they occur in, as the following examples with the 
relevant inteIpretations show: 
(92) a. Two men are in the garden. 
'3(Y)(Y = ( (x)lman(x) & x in the garden ) & IYI = 2' 
b. Mary knows two men. 
'3(y)(y = «x)lman(x) & Mary know x )  & IYI = 2' 
Finally, returning to Milsark's observation that certain weak quantifiers such as many 
can have either a quantificational or an existential interpretation, this can be explained by 
assuming simply that such quantifiers are dually categorized as either A or D. In the first 
case, a quantifier such as many will receive an existential interpretation; in the second, it 
will receive a quantificational interpretation. 
4.2. The semantics of action nominals. 
The results of the §3.3. show that action nominals are syntactically parallel in structure to 
sentences. If the general approach developed here is correct, we would naturally expect to 
find an equally close parallel between the semantics of sentences and action nominals. Let 
us assume therefore that action nouns are expressions of type 11:, <e,X>, or <e, <e,o>, 
depending on how many argument places they require. We have already assumed that the 
function of Nm, just like the function of Pr in sentences, is to map property expressions 
onto propositional functions. Furthermore, since head raising is obligatory in action 
nominals, we must assume that an action noun assigns (or checks the assignment of) a 
theta-role to [Spec, Nm). Hence this position must either be occupied by a lexical NP 
(which must then move to [Spec, D) to receive case) or by PRO, either of which will 
saturate the primary subject position in [Spec, Nm), as required. Some syntactic evidence 
in support of the conclusion that action nominals may have PRO subjects has already been 
discussed in §3.3. As far as the semantics of action nominals is concemed, the apparatus 
we already have will produce if representations and type assignments for NmP virtually 
identical to those of PrP: 
the enemy 
" U[destroy(c)], <c,p> 
NP. destroy(c), 7t " c, e �: destroy, <c,P 
of the city destru'ction 
, ________________ 1 
Both the syntax and the semantics of action nominals is therefore very close to that of the 
gerundive nominals discussed in §3.0. The only real difference between them lies in the 
syntactic ca1Cgory label of the complement of D.7 This of course has syntactic 
consequences that were discussed earlier, but does not seem to materially affect the 
semantics. Both appear to be propositions, whereas result nominals, like basic nouns, are 
not propositions at all, but rather are generalized quantifiers. 
Not es 
1 See Bowers (1991)  and Larson (1990) for arguments against Jackendoffs (1990) 
suggestion that such examples might be instances of gapping. I also show there that the 
needed intennediate category cannot be Ay/J (Pollock (1989». 
2 H D is non-empty, then an English-specific constraint requires that the possessive NP 
move into a postposed of-phrase, as in the following example: 
(i) This singing songs of John's must cease. 
I shall not attempt to analy:re the structure of such postposed genitives in this paper, simply 
noting that in many languages possessives can cooccur with elements ofD without having 
to be postposed (cf. Abney (1987), for discussion). 
3 This analysis is also consistent with the claim of Chomsky (1971 )  that gerundives are 
verbs whereas derived nominals are nouns. 
4 See Tang ( 1990) for detailed arguments in support of this analysis and for many other 
arguments from Chinese in support of the proposed analysis of clause structure and 
nominal structure. 
5 I assume without argument that an agentivc by-phrase is an optional, base-generated 
PP adjunct, as it is in sentences. 
6 It is interesting to note in this connection that in Chinese (see Tang (1990» all 
27 
28 
arguments of nouns are contained in phrases with the general modification marker -tk that 
is used for adjective modifiers, relative clauses and so forth, suggesting once again that 
basic nouns do not take arguments per se, though they can assign theta-roles indirecdy to 
NPs in non-argument positions. 
7 Action nominals are also similar to gerundives in that they may occur with 
demonstratives but not with strong quantifiers: 
(i) a. This/*every/*each desbUction of the city bothers everyone. 
b. That/*most/*all publication(s) of the article precipitated a crisis. 
It seems likely that there is some difference yet to be understood between demonstratives 
and strong quantifIers. 
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